A model for strategic social planning in a fishing economy: Newfoundland and Labrador, 1993-2005 by CLOSE, David W.
373Rev. int. estud. vascos. 52, 2, 2007, 373-398
A model for strategic social planning
in a fishing economy: Newfoundland
and Labrador, 1993-2005
Close, David W.
Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland 
St. John’s, NL, Canada
dclose@mun.ca
BIBLID [0212-7016 (2007), 52: 2; 373-398]
Kanadako probintzia batean gizarte zibileko boluntarioak gizarte politikaren eraketan
sartzeko egindako saioa aztertzen da artikulu honetan. Joera historikoen eta politika zehatzen
diseinuan egindako hutsegiteen konbinazioak galarazi zuen proiektua. Baina saioak porrot egin
arren, irakaspen probetxugarriak eskaintzen dizkie boterea herritarren esku utzi nahi dituzten
gobernuei.
Giltza-hitzak : Gizarte plangintza. Eskualde garapena. Erregenerazio ekonomikoa. Ternua.
El artículo analiza la tentativa de una provincia canadiense de involucrar en la formación de
la política social al sector voluntariado de la sociedad civil. Una combinación de tendencias
históricas y errores en el diseño de políticas concretas socavó el proyecto; a pesar de haber
fracasado, ofrece lecciones útiles a gobiernos que quieran delegar poder a sus ciudadanos.
Palabras clave: Planificación social. Desarrollo regional. Regeneración económica. Terranova.
L’article analyse la tentative d’une province canadienne d’impliquer le secteur bénévole de la
société civile dans la formation de la politique sociale. Une combinaison de tendances historiques
et d’erreurs dans le schéma des politiques concrètes a sapé le projet ; bien qu’il ait échoué, il
offre d’utiles leçons aux gouvernements qui désireraient déléguer le pouvoir à leurs concitoyens.
Mots clés : Planification sociale. Développement régional. Régénération économique. Terre-
Neuve.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW1
Newfoundland and Labrador,2 Canada’s easternmost, small and histori-
cally poor province, began talking about a strategic social plan (SSP) in
1993. By 1998 the Plan was made public. Two years later, it entered into
effect and in 2001 it was fully operational. Then an election in 2003 pro-
duced a change of government and this new administration announced in
2004 that it would not continue the SSP. In 2005, the Strategic Social Plan
of Newfoundland and Labrador was history.
Despite its short life, it ran at full capacity for only three years (2001-
2004), the SSP is a project that deserves the attention of anyone interested
in innovative social policy. The Plan was about doing four things:
• Bring the voluntary, community-based sector (VCBS) –the volunteer
groups which run the local cancer society, women’s centre and kids’
soccer leagues– into the social policy process for more than just ser-
vice delivery.
• Use the energy and expertise of the volunteers who make the VCBS
work to make social policy that better adapts social programs to real
conditions in the province’s communities.
• Lay the foundations for place-based social policymaking by allowing
communities to alter general policies to fit specific local needs.
• Create a framework of collaborative governance, which is centred
around and builds on linkages between government and the voluntary
sector.
But more interesting that what the SSP wanted to do, was why it wanted
to do it.
Development in Newfoundland, as in many other places, has always
meant economic development and nothing else. Once the economy was
right, everything would be fine, because there would be jobs for all and the
social problems that didn’t just disappear would be no match for the
———————————
1. This work is part of a study of the Strategic Social Plan of Newfoundland and Labrador
undertaken with the Values Added CURA (Community-University Research Alliance) carried out by
the Community Services Council (CSC), St. John’s, NL, Canada, and the Memorial University of
Newfoundland. The CURA is financed by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada and directed by Ms. Penelope Rowe, director of the CSC. The author acknowledges
the assistance of Kenny Curlew and Colin Macdonald, research assistants at the CURA, as well
as to his fellow research team members: Larry Felt, Fran Locke, Patti Power, and Penny Rowe. All
errors of fact or interpretation are the author’s.
2. Although the official name of the province is Newfoundland and Labrador, it is still con-
ventional to refer to it by its historic name, Newfoundland. Both are used in this work. 
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province’s plentiful resources. This apparently universal form of economic
determinism did not, however, bear the predicted fruit, at least not in New-
foundland. Rather, the province remained stubbornly underdeveloped, depen-
dent on a fishery that provided little beyond subsistence for many fishers.
Attempts to industrialize were often poorly conceived and equally poorly exe-
cuted. Mines and the forest industry offered opportunities for some, but did
not lift the province out of its doldrums. Having the highest rate of unemploy-
ment in the nation and usually being the country’s poorest province looked
like Newfoundland’s permanent fate.
Then things got worse. The closure of the collapsed cod fishery in 1992
eliminated an estimated 40,000 jobs. This led to a massive out-migration,
amounting to almost 10 percent of the population, which fell from 560,000
to 505,000 between 1991 and 2001. Understandably, rural areas were hard-
est hit.3 Along the 9656 kilometers of the Island of Newfoundland’s
coastline4 fishing community after fishing community saw its young leave,
taking with them their community’s future. Outport Newfoundland, the rural
parts of the province that had for more than two centuries provided its suste-
nance and shaped its culture, was dying.5 Because traditional, economy-cen-
tred plans had not averted the disaster, it seemed the time had come for
radical measures.
The SSP proposed a thorough overhaul of both how the province of New-
foundland and Labrador conceived of development and the place of social
policy within the development process. Government departments were to
lose their monopoly over policymaking at the same time that they would be
forced to leave their silos and start collaborating with each other for the peo-
ple’s greater good. Communities were to be given a voice in determining
what they needed from government to put themselves on a sustainable foot-
ing. In short, government was to be forced to deal with its citizens as equals,
devolving power to those to whom it was constitutionally responsible. In its
intentions, at least, the SSP was revolutionary.
Had the Strategic Social Plan been produced in a province with a history
of experimentation in social policymaking,6 such as Quebec or
———————————
3. J. de Peuter and M. Sorensen, Rural Newfoundland and Labrador Profile: a Ten-year Cen-
sus Analysis. Ottawa: Rural Secretariat, Agriculture and Agri -Food Canada, 2005,
www.rural.gc.ca/research/profile/nl_e.pdf., accessed July 13, 2007.
4. The province’s total coastline includes the Labrador’s coast and the coasts of offshore
islands, for a total length of 23, 212 km. (Natural Resources Canada 2007). Spain’s, including
the Canary Islands, is 7286 km.
5. In Newfoundland, an outport is any coastal rural community and outport Newfoundland is
synonymous with rural Newfoundland. The term literally refers to any port out from St. John’s,
the capital and commercial centre.
6. I use a broad meaning of social policy and thus include health and education, as well as
social services.
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Saskatchewan, there would have been no surprise. Over the years, those
provinces have elected governments with strong commitments to reform.7
Governments there have not shied away from rethinking the roles of state
and citizen or from changing how the political system defines, approaches
and resolves public issues. The SSP, however, came from Newfoundland, a
province with little history of great breakthroughs in any area of public policy.
Naturally, there have been important reforms undertaken over the years, but
governments with a clearly articulated “let’s rethink what government does
and how it does it” approach have been rare.8
A radically reformist policy issuing from a generally cautious political set-
ting inevitably raises a number of questions. These begin with why: what
prompted government to start down the path of strategic social planning, and
what led it to embrace a revolutionary plan? Put a little differently, why did gov-
ernment adopt the concepts of place-based policy making and collaborative
governance as key elements of the SSP when they had never before appeared
in official documents? Following closely is how: what steps did government
take, first, to devise its plan and, second, to make it operational? The next
thing we want to know is how the SSP worked: what results did it produce and
why did it produce those particular outcomes? Finally, since the SSP came to
an end so quickly, the concluding question has to be why it was terminated by
a newly elected government of another party: had it conspicuously failed to
meet its goals or did the new administration simply have a different agenda?
To address these questions, the article moves through several steps. First,
it considers briefly the matter of strategic planning to establish what the con-
cept means in the context of Newfoundland. The next section describes how
the SSP came into being. A third part looks at the Plan’s structure and ana-
lyzes it operation. Particular attention goes to the role assumed by the VCBS
and the mechanisms that were developed to link government directly to the
communities. The fourth section evaluates the SSP’s operation to underline its
strengths and weaknesses, while a fifth offers an interpretation of its demise.
The analysis suggests that two classes of factors must be considered in evalu-
ating the SSP: one consists of the content of specific programs and asks if
changes to these could have let the Plan work better; the other is path depen-
dence, a familiar theme from institutional analysis, which considers how estab-
lished political patterns affected the outcome. A conclusion draws lessons
from the Newfoundland experience that other governments wishing to pursue a
similar strategy might wish to bear in mind.
———————————
7. Reform politics in Saskatchewan since 1944 have revolved around the CCF (Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation) and its successor, the NDP (New Democratic Party), social democ-
rats who created the first government-administered, single-payer health care system in North
America. In Quebec, the reform tradition begins with the Revolution Tranquille of the Parti Liberal
du Québéc (1960-1966) and continues today through the Parti Québécois. 
8. Even the first post-Confederation-with-Canada administration of the Liberal Joseph R.
“Joey” Smallwood, 1949-1971, was only a partial exception. Although Smallwood greatly
expanded education, health, and social services, and gave a greater voice to outport Newfound-
land, he also kept the highly centralized, patronage-based politics of his predecessors.
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2. STRATEGIC PLANNING IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR: THE ROAD
TO THE SSP
Governments plan and sometimes they call their plans “strategic”. Strat-
egy means having a central, long-term objective and devising means to
secure that objective. Strategy necessarily implies planning. Strategic plan-
ning, by extension, suggests “highly structured, future-oriented management
techniques”9 that better “(align) an organization with its environment”.10 This
demands that a strategic plan be “action-oriented (and)…carefully linked to
implementation”.11 Although strategic planning in general has its critics12
and there are specific caveats issued with regard to strategic planning by
governments,13 there are nevertheless clear successes.14
It was Premier Clyde Wells (1989-1996) who brought strategic planning
to the provincial government. Wells introduced both a strategic economic
plan (1992) and the initial version of the SSP. Both were efforts to get fresh
approaches to long-standing economic ills and the social consequences of a
weak economy.
As with many other economies built on raw materials (such as fish or
minerals) and semi-finished products (for example, newsprint), Newfound-
land and Labrador has seldom known sustained prosperity. Although join-
ing Canada in 1949 gave the province’s inhabitants a reasonably secure
social safety net, the structure of the economy changed little.15 As a
result, unemployment has remained well above national levels–14.8% com-
pared to 6.3% nationally in 2006;16 and, until revenues from offshore oil
began flowing in 1997, per capita income in Newfoundland and Labrador
———————————
9. F.S. Berry and B. Wechsler, “State Agencies’ Experience with Strategic Planning: Findings
from a National Survey,” Public Administration Review, 55:2, 1995, 161.
10. G. Kissler, et al, “State Strategic Planning: Suggestions from the Oregon Experience,”
Public Administration Review, 58:4, 1998: 353.
11. T. Poister and G. Streib, “Elements of Strategic Planning and Management in Municipal
Government: Status after Two Decades,” Public Administration Review, 65:1, 2005, 46.
12. H. Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for
Planning, Plans, Planners. Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan 1994.
13. Berry and Wechsler, 159-168.
14. Kissler, et al.; cf. J.D. House and K. McGrath, “Innovative Governance and Development
in the New Ireland: Social Partnership and the Integrated Approach,” Governance, 17:1, 2004,
29-58.
15. It is more accurate to say that the province’s great economic drivers are still perceived
as coming from the resource sector, currently offshore oil. However, the service sector, govern-
ment and commerce, provide the bulk of employment in Newfoundland and Labrador and gener-
ate most of its income. 
16. Statistics Canada, “Latest release from the Labour Force Survey,” January 5, 2007,
http://www.statcan.ca/english/Subjects/Labour/LFS/lfs-en.htm, retrieved January 7, 2007.
Note that this is with a petroleum boom that has given the province some of the highest growth
rates in Canada for the last five years.
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was generally Canada’s lowest. To maintain public services at levels com-
parable to those of other provinces, the provincial government had to rely
heavily, often for half of its revenues, on federal transfers to individual and
equalization payments.17
2.1. Building the SSP
When Canada’s federal government reduced its spending on social pro-
grams in the late 1980s, the cuts hit Newfoundland and Labrador particu-
larly hard, with rising unemployment, higher unemployment insurance and
welfare expenditures, and a shrinking tax base leading to greater provincial
budget deficits. In response, the newly elected Liberal government estab-
lished the Economic Recovery Commission in 1989 and subsequently
announced a Strategic Economic Plan (SEP), its roadmap for economic
development. Demographic trends (low birth rate, aging population, high
out-migration) and the 1992 closure of the cod fishery, however, increased
the demand for social programs and created additional pressures for gov-
ernment action. These combined forces led Premier Wells to announce in
1993 the development of a strategic social plan to complement the SEP. A
consultation paper was released in 1996 by Wells’s successor, fellow Lib-
eral Brian Tobin, explaining why the government was proposing a strategic
social plan.
A fundamental rethinking is required of both the system, and how the
provinces/territories and federal government work together. Piecemeal or ad
hoc changes to existing programs will not achieve needed reforms…This is
why Newfoundland and Labrador needs a strategic social plan…We cannot
address 21st-century problems with 20th-century…We must assess the ser-
vices we provide and re-think the ways they are provided…Then we can formu-
late our priorities and our choices as a rational and sustainable strategy for
the future.18
This consultation paper also announced the establishment of a Social
Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC) to conduct a public dialogue. The SPAC,
comprised of fifteen representatives from various sectors of civil society,
held public meetings around the province, conducted roundtables, and
received briefs and presentations from individuals, voluntary organizations
and community groups. Its final report combined the themes raised in the
public consultations with a set of conceptual benchmarks that included gov-
ernance, collaborative partnerships, public consultation, citizen engagement
———————————
17. Equalization payments are transfers from the federal government of Canada to offset
differences in fiscal capacity, i.e. the ability to generate tax revenues, among provinces. Their
objective is to give all provinces per capita tax revenues equal to that of the average of all ten
provinces. The program does not aim to raise per capita incomes or to be a source of develop-
ment funds.
18. Government of Newfoundland, Strategic Social Plan Consultation Paper. St. John’s: The
Queen’s Printer, 1996, 3.
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and accountability. Thus, the conceptual core of the report took concepts
derived from neoliberal discourse and turned them around so they spoke of
citizen participation and community control.19
Concretely, the SPAC called for a new approach to making social policy
that would “acknowledge the essential roles of individuals and communities
in fostering social and economic well-being”.20 The provincial government
accepted the SPAC’s report and created both interdepartmental and minis-
terial committees to translate it into policy. Adopting the outlook of the
SPAC was one of several significant “off-path changes”, deviations from
established procedures and behaviours, that marked the Plan. Yet it is not
at all clear that government appreciated how profoundly it would have to
change its ways to let the SSP conform to the spirit of the SPAC’s report. In
any case, in 1998 it released: People, Partners and Prosperity: A Strategic
Social Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador.21 At that point the SSP ceased
being a bottom-up citizens’ initiative and started becoming a top-down gov-
ernment project.
2.2. What the SSP proposed
The SSP advocated a place-based model for development that
demanded a more collaborative form of governance. Place-based refers to
expanding the focus of policy making to include regions (here defined by a
mix of geographical and socio-economic criteria) as well as functional
socio-economic categories; while collaborative governance suggests incor-
porating more non-governmental actors in the design and delivery of poli-
cies –effectively devolving authority to them. As such, it represented a
significant shift in the province’s approach to policy formulation, program
design, and service delivery. The SSP sought to move public policy forma-
tion and decision-making from a reactive model to a preventive one
emphasizing early intervention. It advocated linking social and economic
development through broad-based strategies at government and communi-
ty levels using integrated and coordinated public policy responses. The
Plan also proposed increased partnerships involving the provincial govern-
ment, the federal government, communities, and voluntary organizations
———————————
19. S. Phillips, “More Than Just Stakeholders: Reforming State-Voluntary Relations,” Jour-
nal of Canadian Studies, 35:4, 2001, 182-202; and S. Patten, “Democratizing the institutions of
policymaking: democratic consultation and participatory administration,” 2001, Journal of Cana-
dian Studies, 35:4, 221-239, examine these questions in the context of Canadian national poli-
tics.
20. Government of Newfoundland, Report of the Social Policy Advisory Committee. Volume 1:
What the People Said. St. John’s, NL: Office of the Queen’s Printer, 8. See also, Government of
Newfoundland, Report of the Social Policy Advisory Committee. Volume 2: Investing in People and
Communities. St. John’s, NL: Office of the Queen’s Printer, 1997
21. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, People, Partners and Prosperity: A Strategic
Social Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador. St. John’s, NL: The Queen’s Printer, 1998.
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as the basis of sustainable development.22 The SSP had four expected
outcomes:
• Vibrant communities where people are actively involved.
• Sustainable regions based on strategic investment in people.
• Self-reliant, healthy, educated citizens living in safe communities.
• Integrated and evidence-based policies and programs.23
Although these provided rough benchmarks for assessing its success,
there was no scheme for measuring how fully the objectives were achieved:
Thus the SSP was about building a new way to make social policy, built
around “a partnership approach to policy development and service delivery”.24
The partners were to be the state, the SSP regional committees, and the
VCBS. What is significant is not the talk of service delivery, a common theme
of public-private partnerships (PPP), but rather the reference to policy develop-
ment. The SSP aimed at bringing into the policymaking process the voluntary
sector and the communities in which the sector’s organizations are rooted.
This objective ties directly into place-based development and evidence-based
decision-making, as the VCBS could not formulate good policies for communi-
ties without ready access to good data. Putting the principles into practice, in
turn, required new structures to facilitate interdepartmental collaboration, pub-
lic consultation, and citizen engagement in the policymaking process.25
Viewed from one angle, the SSP looked like the Newfoundland and
Labrador edition of alternative service delivery in the social policy sector.
This would make it about engaging the voluntary sector, civil society more
broadly, in PPPs. These most commonly take the form of contracting out the
delivery of government responsibilities to private organizations, making them
delivery systems. Voluntary sector groups are attractive participants because
of their expertise, flexibility, and low operating costs.26 Entering into a PPP
brings a voluntary organization benefits, such as greater material resources,
but also costs, in the form of administrative overhead, loss of flexibility, and
potentially a loss of focus.27 Although the province’s economic status in the
———————————
22. M. Rowe and V. Randell, 1999, “Newfoundland and Labrador’s Strategic Social Plan,” in
Collaborative Government: Is there a Canadian Way?, ed.. S. Delacourt & D.G. Lenihan, Toronto:
Institute for Public Administration of Canada, 1999, 81-91.
23. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, People, Partners and Prosperity, 23-32.
24. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, People, Partners and Prosperity, 10.
25. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, People, Partners and Prosperity, 3-8.
26. A. Ware, Between Profit and State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; C.
Brinkerhoff, “Government-nonprofit partnership: a defining framework,” Public Administration
Review, 22, 2002, 19-30.
27. G. Nowland Foreman, “Purchase-of-service contracting: voluntary organizations and civil
society,” American Behavioral Scientist, 42:1, 1998, 221-239.
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mid-nineties justified a search for savings, there was more than dollars
behind the SSP.
Since at least 1986, when the provincial Royal Commission on
Employment and Unemployment, released its report, Building on Our
Strengths,28 decentralized, though not devolved, development has been
part of the policy discourse in Newfoundland and Labrador. The collapse
of the cod fishery in 1992 and the seemingly permanent moratorium that
has followed brought economic and social problems that buffeted the hun-
dreds of coastal communities that had lived off cod for centuries. As fami-
lies abandoned their homes in search of a living, a sense of crisis came
to prevail in many of the province’s smaller towns. Accordingly, focusing
on communities in constructing a strategic social plan was a natural and
logical step. The voluntary sector, and even more the volunteers, in those
communities could be both the analysts of what needed to be done and
the catalysts doing it.
Ostensibly about social policy, the SSP thus also had a rural focus.
Although not specifically a response to the post-1992 crisis in rural New-
foundland and Labrador, the SSP’s emphasis on community and sustainabili-
ty fit well with the greatest social policy challenge of the nineties. Indeed,
viewing the SSP in the context of the crisis of rural Newfoundland and
Labrador makes the Plan look a bit like a community development initiative.
Perhaps inadvertently the Plan assumed multiple responsibilities.
One point that emerges is that the SSP gave little attention to questions
of implementation or to how to evaluate the policy’s progress. This omission
was doubtless partly the product of a civil service stretched very thin after
several years of downsizing, it fell from 13,351 in 1987 to 8745 early in
1999,29 but may also have reflected the initiative’s novelty. In either case,
the Plan had to be built on the fly, with little guidance and few guidelines.
The SSP was not a detailed strategic plan.
Recognizing that economic and social development should not be sepa-
rated, the SSP was clear about the need to integrate social and economic
policy planning more closely and to engage communities directly in the pol-
icy process. These objectives focus on the input and conversion facets of
policymaking, not the concrete policies that result. This was a “process is
policy” strategic plan that had absolutely no concrete deliverables. As
such, it needed a strong, flexible, and well-designed set of structures to
make it work.
———————————
28. Government of Newfoundland, Building on Our Strengths, Report of the Royal Commis-
sion on Employment and Unemployment. St. John’s, NL: The Queen’s Printer, 1986.
29. Statistics Canada, “Public sector employment, wages and salaries, monthly,” CANSIM
Table 183-00023, Record number 1713,
http://www.statcan.ca/ cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=1713, accessed July
14, 2007.
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3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SSP
The SSP had four main structural components: an inter-ministerieral com-
mittee; the Premier’s Council on Social Development (PCSD); a secretariat
(SSPO); and six Regional Steering Committees (RSC). Though important to
its implementation, the first two were somewhat peripheral to the Plan’s
operational logic; nonetheless, the PCSD played a useful role in social policy
planning more generally. The third was administratively central. And the
fourth was crucial. We shall treat the peripheral instruments briefly, the
SSP’s administrative arm in more depth and give the most detailed consider-
ation to the RSC.
3.1. SSP Structures
3.1.1. Inter-ministerial committee
The inter-ministerial committee brought together all departments of gov-
ernment concerned with the SSP. For the first time in province’s history, the
finance minister sat on an operational committee with ministers holding
social portfolios. Social policy had never been a great concern of Newfound-
land governments, whether colonial or provincial Since joining Canada in
1949, the provincial government’s slogan has been “Develop or perish!”,30
and all administrations, Liberal or Conservative, have acted on the belief that
a rising economic tide would lift all social boats. Thus this committee and
the parallel deputy ministers’31 committee marked a substantial off-path
change in the direction of horizontal collaboration among the various min-
istries of state. This horizontal collaboration, often called breaking out of
departmental silos, was an objective of the SSP,32 but as we shall see, it was
also a prerequisite to be met before the Plan could work as envisioned.
3.1.2. PCSD
Although its establishment was recommended in the Plan, the Premier’s
Council on Social Development did not have a major role within the SSP, as it
did not have institutional links with either the RSCs or the VCBS. This consul-
tative council was, however, actively involved in the preparation of the Social
———————————
30. For a study how “develop or perish” was put into action under the government of New-
foundland’s first provincial premier, Joey Smallwood, see, D. Letto, Chocolate Bars and Rubber
Boots. Paradise, NL: Blue Hill Publishers, 1998.
31. A deputy minister is a career bureaucrat who is the administrative head of a depart-
ment. The position parallels that of a viceministro in Spain. 
32. P. Power and F. Locke, with L. Felt, and D. Close, And No One Heard: Regional Horizontal
management and Government Silos in the Implementation of the Strategic Social Plan for New-
foundland and Labrador. Research Paper, Values Added Community University Research Alliance,
St. John’s, NL, 2006, http://www.envision.ca/pdf/cura/And_No_One_Heard_Nov_06.pdf,
accessed July 15, 2007.
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Audit, which collected the data published in the Community Accounts. These,
in turn, provide the data that communities can use to plan their futures. Fur-
ther, unlike most consultative councils, the PCSD was able exercise a signifi-
cant amount of initiative and took a role as an advocate for Newfoundland’s
social policy network.33 Nevertheless, it was not designed to serve as a link
between the SSP and the cabinet. Thus its potential to advance the specific
objectives of the Plan was limited.
3.1.3. SSPO
The Strategic Social Plan Office (SSPO) was small, never more than six
professional staff, and ill-funded, its budget –also the SSP’s funding– was
static at $Cdn 2 million from 2000 to 2004 and at the end amounted to
1/20th of 1 per cent of the province’s budget. With these meagre resources,
the SSPO was to be the PCSD’s secretariat, coordinate preparation the
Social Audit and the Community Accounts, develop the horizontal links
between departments needed to permit place-based policymaking and be the
link between the government and the RSC. It had neither formal policymaking
responsibility nor was it actively engaged in policy analysis and planning. The
SSPO was really a semi-administrative entity whose responsibilities outran
its resources.
Because the Plan needed horizontal collaboration among departments of
government, the Office could not be housed in an existing ministry. There-
fore, the SSPO found a home in the Executive Council, which is similar to a
ministry of the presidency. This brought the SSP an advantage, being at the
centre of the provincial state, and a disadvantage, being led by an assistant
deputy minister (ADM), because the Executive Council already had a DM in
the Clerk of the Executive Council. Although this may seem like bureaucratic
rank-pulling, it mattered. The SSPO’s ADM had to deal with DMs from far
stronger departments, trying to change how they ran their ministries in order
to implement the SSP. Nevertheless, according to a former cabinet minister,
it did secure a measure of coordination among departments with social
affairs responsibilities.34
3.1.4. RSC
At the heart of the SSP were the Regional Steering Committees, whose
task was to connect government with Newfoundland’s communities. It was
thus the RSC where community strengthening and renewal would take shape
———————————
33. D. Close, P. Rowe and C. Wheaton, 2007. Planning the Future of Rural Newfoundland
and Labrador by Engaging the Public: From the Strategic Social Plan to the Rural Secretariat.
Research Paper, Values Added Community University Research Alliance, St. John’s, NL, 2007,
http://www.envision.ca/pdf/cura/Planning_Future_Rural_NL_Jan08_07.pdf, accessed July 15,
2007.
34. P. Warren, interview with the author, St. John’s, NL, September 8, 2003.
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as communities and government turned their efforts toward this common
goal. That, in any event, was the intention. What happened in practice was
substantially different, in great part because of the structure of the RSC.
To give the six RSCs – five on the Island of Newfoundland and one for
Labrador – a high profile, the government appointed the regional directors of
government departments and the presidents of regional health, hospital and
school boards. However, this resulted in fewer places on the Committees for the
VCBS. Indeed, in the two regions studied intensively by the research team with
which I work, only 6 of 65 members came from community based
organizations.35 Further, the Committees had little funding: just enough to do
some traveling in their region and to hire one staff person, a regional planner.36
As a consequence the RSCs often had to turn to their members for extra
resources.37
3.1.5. A final note on structure
The government of Newfoundland and Labrador was operating without a
map or compass when it set up the SSP structures. No one had done any-
thing of the sort before, so there were no models to follow. In retrospect, it
seems that the government unconsciously followed an established line and
applied the template developed for other regional boards. Thus in the govern-
ment’s institutional perspective the SSP became a variant of earlier decen-
tralization policies and not an exercise in devolution. Put differently, it proved
difficult for government to shed long-standing habits of centralized adminis-
tration and turn power back to the province’s citizens.
4. THE SSP’S PERFORMANCE
Though short-lived, ill-funded, and with little administrative support, the
SSP did operate from 2000 to early 2004 and has left a record to evaluate.
Indeed, its record is complete. We shall examine here in some detail two
aspects of the Plan’s operations: its administration and its system of linkages.
4.1. Administering the SSP: the SSPO in detail
Officials who worked with the SSPO acknowledge that the agency had to
invent its role as it went along, there being no appropriate pre-existing inter-
———————————
35. An informal survey of the remaining four boards suggests that roughly 10 percent was
the usual level of representation afforded the VCBS.
36. The title is misleading because the regional planners did not do regional planning.
Rather they served as administrative officials, outreach officers, and links between the RSC and
the SSPO, on the one hand, and the VCBS, on the other.
37. Values Added Community University Research Alliance, Interviews, Community Groups,
2005; hereafter cited as CURA, Community Groups.
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nal models.38 Therefore the process of constructing the implementing
machinery began slowly and proceeded empirically: the first SSP secretariat,
the SSP Unit, started in 1998 with just one person: the Assistant Secretary
to Cabinet, who added the secretariat to her existing duties.39 Apparently,
insufficient forethought had been given to the policy instruments needed to
make the Plan workable.
Looking at the Office’s two linkage roles –among government depart-
ments and between government and the SSP Regional Steering Committees–
raises two points. First, its role in linking government departments should
not be seen as horizontal management.40 Rather, it appears to have been
developing a role as a hub that connected the social policy sides of all gov-
ernment departments.41 Turning next to its role dealing with the Plan’s
Regional Steering Committee, the logic of the system left the SSPO repre-
senting government to the regions as well as the regions to the government.
This was substantial and subtle political task for a small agency with a signif-
icant administrative burden.
According to a senior official who worked with the SSPO for several years,
much of the Office’s work consisted of maintaining contact with the commit-
tees.42 It did this, first, by having a representative attend RSC meetings and,
second, through the regional planner each RSC had. Though responsible to
the RSC, the planner was paid by the SSPO, and part of a planner’s job was to
liaise with the Office. The SSPO also hired a fulltime researcher to be an in-
house consultant and to conduct workshops with the regional committees to
raise their analytical capacity and let them contribute more to strategic plan-
ning. This research function dovetailed with the secretariat’s work on the
Social Audit and Community Accounts, which have proven useful for planning
social development. Thought not derisory, the administrative resources avail-
able to the SSP through the SSPO were nevertheless slight.
4.2. A closer look at the Regional Committees and the VCBS
Regional boards and committees have been used to decentralize public
administration in Newfoundland and Labrador since the 1980s. However, the
RSCs had two functions that set them apart from other regional entities.
———————————
38. Strategic Social Plan Office, author’s interview with officials, July 7, 2003, hereafter
cited as SSPO interview; Rural Secretariat, author’s interview with official, June 7, 2005; here-
after cited as Rural Secretariat interview.
39. Rural Secretariat interview.
40. G. B. Peters, Managing Horizontal Government. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1998; M. Hopkins, C. Couture and E. Moore, Moving from the Heroic to the Everyday:
Lessons Learned in Leading Horizontal Projects. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Devel-
opment, 2001.
41. SSPO interview; Rural Secretariat interview.
42. Rural Secretariat interview.
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First, they were to be the implementing mechanisms for the multi-sectoral
development-cum-social policy partnerships the Plan called for, while their
second task was to build partnerships with their region’s VCBS to plan inte-
grated social and economic development.43 Their objective was to go beyond
decentralization and move well toward devolution. However, as already noted,
the RSCs’ structure got in the way.
In order to set the multi-sectoral partnerships in motion, something
that in the end happened infrequently,44 the vast majority of the RSCs’
members were ex oficio appointments: namely the heads of other regional
boards or regional directors of government departments (Table 1). Although
this makeup reinforced the Committees’ image as policy refineries where
regional policy elites worked, it squeezed out the VCBS, as only about 10
percent of RSC members came from the voluntary sector. Indeed, the
RSCs generally failed to engage voluntary groups: efforts to bring the VCBS
into the regional social policy process seldom went beyond sending invita-
tions to meetings the committee held throughout their region or notifying
groups of special events. Worse, the relationship between the committees
and the VCSB turned into one of service provider and client, with the RSCs
helping community groups get financial support for projects.45 As the orga-
nizations on the RSC were those from which the VCBS sought funding, the
outcome was logical.
Further, except for organizations composed of municipal governments,
municipalities were not represented and the business community only found
a place at the table as members of quasi-governmental regional develop-
ment boards.46 If the RSCs were only about social policy-making the exclu-
sion of local governments is defensible, as these have no social policy role
in Newfoundland and Labrador. If, though, community development was the
goal, the exclusion of municipal governments is unjustifiable. If fact, their
absence, added to the heavy representation of provincial government
departments and provincial government-appointed regional administrative
boards, make it look as though the government in St. John’s wanted to tap
the policy ideas of the communities but not let those communities develop
their ideas themselves.
———————————
43. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, People, Partners and Prosperity, 17-1.8
44. Partnerships were stuck but they were narrow and ad hoc. For example, in one of the
regions the Departments of Health and Education agreed to contribute equally to the salary of
an additional speech pathologist. Though small in itself, the interdepartmental collaboration was
highly unusual and could have paved the way to more joint projects.
45. P. Power and F. Locke, with L. Felt, Everybody Wanted It: Collaboration between the Volun-
tary, Community-based Sector and the Regional Steering Committees of the Strategic Social Plan
for Newfoundland and Labrador. Research Paper, Values Added Community University Research
Alliance, St. John’s, NL, 2006, 14-16,
http://www.envision.ca/pdf/cura/Everybody_Wanted_It_Nov_06.pdf, accessed July 16, 2007.
46. Values Added Community University Research Alliance, Interviews, Steering Committee,
2005; hereafter cited as, CURA, Steering Committees.
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Table 1. Regional Steering Committee Membership47
Organization Type Number of Members 
(including alternates)






Regional economic development 13
Health institutions 8
Other 3
Strategic Social Plan 2
TOTAL 65
Source: Calculated by author.
Moreover, the structure of the SSP committees also worked against hori-
zontal collaboration. Departmental representatives tended to stay within their
hierarchies and representatives from other regional boards also worked
along known paths.48 This is not surprising, as policies are made within
departments, not between or among them. Government simply was not struc-
tured to facilitate inter-departmental communication; thus what the SSP
sought to do went against the system’s institutional logic. At best, regional
representatives of the various social policy departments met more frequent-
ly, discovered their common interests and problems, and begin building infor-
mal ties that might ease future collaboration. A positive step, but not what
the SSP’s designers hoped for.
Nevertheless, RSC members reported good relations with government
(Table 2), suggesting that some linkages did develop. Further, respondents
noted good rapport among the members and several commented on the
trust built within their committees. At this level, the SSP worked well and
demonstrated that regional policy elites could work together effectively to
plan social policy. Social capital was being accumulated but it was happening
between government officials and the leaders of quasi-governmental boards.
Although this advanced the horizontal collaboration agenda, it did little to
bring the VCBS into the policy process.
———————————
47. Table 1 reflects the membership of the two RSCs studied in depth by the Values Added
CURA. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the representation of VCBS organizations was no high-
er on the other committees.
48. CURA Steering Committees and CURA Community Groups.
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Table 2. RSC Members Perceptions of Relations with SSPO
Perception Responses (out of 17)
Good Relationship with SSPO 8
SSP staff at meetings 7
Most contact is through the Planner 5
RSC sets own objectives guided by SSP 5 *
Limited administrative support 3
Regional work more important than SSPO 3
Source: Computed from CURA, Steering Committees.
*: N = 13
Finally, although the VCBS was supposed to be the core of the SSP, there
was little knowledge of the Plan within the sector. Twenty-seven groups in one
of the six regions were questioned about the SSP. Twenty-four (89 percent)
had heard of the Plan; 17 (63 percent) knew some of the individuals who
were RSC members in their region; 14 (52 percent) knew nothing about the
committee; but only 8 (30 percent) felt that they had sufficient knowledge of
the SSP and the committee to complete interviews.49
Power and Locke suggest that, like government, the voluntary, communi-
ty-based sector works within silos.50 The local cancer society works with the
provincial and national offices of that organization far more than it does with
the local branch of the heart fund. Further, even if the leaders of voluntary
organizations in small towns are natural community leaders, which need not
always be the case,51 the organizations themselves have different objectives
and distinct clienteles. There is no reason why they should work together;
indeed, since they compete for donor funds, there can be good reasons not
to cooperate. Finally, it is not clear that VCBS leaders had the skills to oper-
ate effectively within mid-level policy councils, like the Steering Committees,
yet this problem was not addressed.
———————————
49. CURA, Community Groups.
50. P. Power and F. Locke, with L. Felt and D. Close, And No One Heard: Regional Horizontal
management and Government Silos in the Implementation of the Strategic Social Plan for New-
foundland and Labrador. Research Paper, Values Added Community University Research Alliance,
St. John’s, NL, http://www.envision.ca/pdf/cura/And_No_One_Heard_Nov_06.pdf, 2006,
accessed July 17, 2007.
51. The local head of the heart fund may not be interested in anything besides collecting
money for his charity, just as the president of a community’s softball league need not care about
much besides her game. It may even be a mistake to classify these individuals as potential
community leaders, as their participation in voluntary activities could as easily be private regard-
ing – it is what they want to do – as public regarding – they do it for the common good. This is a
question that merits further study.
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4.3. The SSP’s end
The Conservatives replaced the Liberals as Newfoundland’s governors in
the October 2003 elections. Although both parties are ideologically centrist,
the Conservatives’ development policy was focused on the economy and the
SSP was dropped.52 The PCSD did not meet again after the election, but the
RSCs were not abolished until 2005. A new organization, the Rural Secretari-
at, took the SSP’s place. It too is run from the Executive Council by a small
secretariat, but has an even smaller budget than did the SSP.53
5. ANALYSIS
From the foregoing, we can say that the SSP did relatively little for the
VCBS and took few steps toward place-based policymaking or devolving
authority to encourage collaborative governance. We now ask why this hap-
pened, looking first at the effects of specific policies, and then at the effect
of path dependence.
5.1. Specific policies
5.1.1 No Policy Deliverables
The relationship between process and product is at once straightforward
and complicated. Without Henry Ford’s assembly line there could not have
been a Model T, but if the Model T had not been a success other manufactur-
ers would not have set up their own assembly lines. A process needs a prod-
uct before it can be evaluated. Yet the SSP’s product was its process. Was
that its Achilles’ heel, too?
Doubtlessly, the SSP would have had a higher profile if it had incorporat-
ed an array of concrete policies. These would have given the VCBS material
to deliver and the province’s communities tools to use as they planned for
the future. Moreover, it is conceivable that having material benefits from the
Plan would have prompted the VCBS to press government for stronger, more
active SSP, perhaps increasing its budget and expanding the SSPO, But mak-
ing those policies effective would have demanded precisely the tight inter-
departmental coordination that characterizes horizontal collaboration, one of
the very things the SSP was to establish.
———————————
52. Although the program was evaluated in 2003, no assessment was done after its termi-
nation. See Helleur and Associates, Learning Study: has the Government Started Doing Business
as Envisioned by the Strategic Social Plan? St. John’s, NL: Jane Helleur & Associates, 2003.
53. J. Bennett, 2007. Collaboration or Consultation? The Development and Implementation
of Social Policy in Rural Newfoundland and Labrador from the Strategic Social Plan to the Rural
Secretariat. Unpub. MA Thesis, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of New-
foundland, St. John’s, NL, 2007.
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Was the SSP then compromised from the outset? Having no policy deliver-
ables was a signal disadvantage but it need not have been sufficient to make
the Plan unviable. Had the VCBS been engaged as foreseen and the Regional
Committees functioned as hoped there could have been enough positive
results to raise the SSP’s profile. That, however, probably required a more
engaged civil society and a government with historically broader perspectives
on development and a greater readiness to share power with its citizens.
5.1.2. Implementation
The document presenting the Plan to the public was short on specifics
and the evolution of the SSPO suggested that a good deal of the Plan’s
machinery was built on the fly. How clear, then, was the government about
what was needed to make the Plan work? Had it thought about how many
changes it would have to make?
A document announcing a new program cannot present a fully elaborated
framework for its operation. Even so, the SSP started life with many loose
ends. The two most obvious of these were the absence of operational mea-
sures by which to know if the Plan’s goals were being met and the manner in
which the SSPO was set up and staffed. To some extent, these reflect the
program’s novelty and would be part of the start up costs of any radical poli-
cy initiative. There is, though, one area where hindsight causes us to ques-
tion the SSP’s design: the structure of the RSCs.
Governance refers to linking and coordinating government and non-govern-
mental actors to make and deliver policy; and it implies shifting authority to
those non-governmental actors. However, we have seen that the RSCs were
composed principally of representatives of government departments and quasi-
autonomous, government-established health services, education and economic
development boards. Since few of the RSC members came from the voluntary
sector, it appears that the committees were set up, perhaps inadvertently, to let
regional administrative boards and regional branches of government depart-
ments establish more effective contact with each other. This is a laudable
administrative objective that should increase horizontal coordination, but it is
not governance. A 2003 consultant’s report, which assessed the SSP’s perfor-
mance, recommended the development of clearer links between the VCBS and
the RSCs, so perhaps time would have resolved this problem.54
What is true of governance also applies to civil society. The structure of
the RSCs not only gave the voluntary, community-based sector little represen-
tation, in many cases it also left the volunteers having to deal as equals with
those on whom they depended for funding. Further, the capacity of the VCBS
and its members to engage immediately as active members of a policy-mak-
ing team may have been overestimated.
———————————
54. Helleur and Associates, 2003.
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5.1.3. Time and resources
Did the SSP have enough time to find its way and become a useable strate-
gy for making social policy in Newfoundland and Labrador? Perhaps four years
would have been enough if there had been a culture of devolving power to citi-
zens and encouraging horizontal policy planning, as well as providing more
material resources to support the process. That might have made the Plan an
incremental experiment in policy thinking that would be introduced, implement-
ed, tested, and revised after a few years. However, the SSP moved policy think-
ing in a dramatically new direction at a time when there were few resources
available to facilitate the change. And, when the 2003 elections brought a new
party to power, the SSP came to an abrupt end.
Obviously, a new administration can drop an existing program in order to
advance its agenda. In any event, although there is no evidence that the Liberals
would not have kept the SSP had they returned to office in 2003, neither is there
any suggestion that they would have significantly rethought and restructured their
program. Recall that from 2000 to 2003 the budget of the SSP stayed frozen at
$2 million per year, while the general provincial budget was growing by 22 per-
cent, from $3.1 billion to $3.8 billion. This does not give much reason to believe
that the Liberals would have done more than tinker with SSP had they won again.
5.2. Path dependence
Path dependence refers to the tendency of institutions to follow estab-
lished patterns, to do things in established ways and by known means;55 and
by defining institutions to mean repeated patterns of interaction, the concept
stretches to include both formal organizations and long-established behav-
ioural preferences. Thus institutions can include broad historic patterns of
structuring authority and more discrete policy preferences.
5.2.1. Historical tendencies
Whether as a colony, short-lived Dominion,56 or province of Canada, what
is now Newfoundland and Labrador had a centralized government.57 The pat-
———————————
55. P. Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics,” American
Political Science Review, 94:2, 2000, 251-267.
56. From 1931 to 1934, Newfoundland was recognized by Britain as a Dominion, which
gave it a constitutional status equal to Canada within the British Empire. It lost this in 1934
when self-government was suspended.
57. On this see, S. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971; S.
McCorquodale, Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” in Canadian Provincial Politics, ed., M.
Robin, Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 138-170, 1978; R. Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada.
Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1991, 47-92; R. Gwyn, Smallwod: the Unlikely Revolutionary.
2d ed., Toronto: McLellan & Stewart, 1999; J. D. House, Against the Tide: Battling for Economic
Renewal in Newfoundland and Labrador. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999; V. Summers,
“Between a Rock and a hard Place: Regime Change in Newfoundland,” in The Provincial State in
Canada, ed. K. Brownsley and M. Howlett, Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2000, 23-47.
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tern of settlement, with outports stretched along the coast and very few larg-
er settlements outside St. John’s, not only made communication difficult but
also complicated the provision of government services to these outlying
areas. Economic organization reinforced geography as the fishers in the out-
ports depended on merchants concentrated in St. John’s to buy their fish
and to provide them with credit for the next year’s fishery. Further, until Con-
federation in 1949, the political role of most outports was limited to return-
ing a member to the House of Assembly, generally a parachuted candidate58
from the capital. A constituency that elected a government member got its
reward in the form of patronage –it “won its vote”; those electing an opposi-
tion member waited until next time. Citizen activism had little room or
encouragement to grow.
Although one pre-1949 movement –William Ford Coaker’s Fishermen’s
Protective Union in the early twentieth century– challenged this system,59
there were no significant changes to the model of governance until self-gov-
ernment was taken from Newfoundland in 1934. Then when Joey Small-
wood’s pro-Confederation-with-Canada forces won a referendum in 1948 the
old order lost its chance to return. Changing the legal regime, however, did lit-
tle to change Newfoundland’s political style: the outports were better repre-
sented but patronage politics still dominated and decisions were made at
the centre, and mainly by the premier. And although administrative decentral-
ization has become common, decisional power has stayed in St. John’s.
For the SSP to have worked, the politics of Newfoundland and Labrador
would have needed a significant reorientation. That would have required the
government to have dedicated substantial energy, time, and money to assure
that decisional power was devolved to communities and that departments
began working together to provide integrated policies. This did not occur;
whether it was due to lack of commitment or a shortage of resources is
immaterial.
5.2.2. Low profile social policy
As noted in the introduction, social policy innovation has not been a prior-
ity for Newfoundland and Labrador’s governments.60 This does not mean that
———————————
58. A parachuted candidate is one who does not live in the constituency in which she or he
runs.
59. I. McDonald, “To Each His Own.” William Coaker and the Fishermen’s Protective Union
in Newfoundland. St. John’s, NL: ISER, 1987.
60. There is one significant exception: resettlement. Between 1954 and 1975, 28,000 peo-
ple left their isolated, rural communities and moved to larger, more central towns, at government
expense. In all, some 250 communities vanished. The program was controversial then and still
stirs emotions today, which may explain why the Newfoundland and Labrador government avoids
social experimentation. For an introduction to the resettlement program, see, Maritime History
Archive, Resettlement: No Great Future. St. John’s: Maritime History archive, Memorial University of
Newfoundland, 2005, http://www.mun.ca/mha/resettlement/index.html, accessed July 17, 2007.
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they have ignored social issues, only that they have prioritized seeking the
economic resources needed to address social questions. So, one after
another, resource megaprojects have been put in motion that have created
thousands of jobs and pumped millions of dollars into the provincial econo-
my. None of them, unfortunately, proved sustainable, leaving the status quo
ante of low incomes, poor permanent job prospects, low levels of education,
and uneven levels of health care in their wake.
Thus to move into a project like the SSP that dealt with engaging the vol-
untary sector, passing decisional power to communities and not just coordi-
nating social policy across departments but actually integrating economic
and social policies to address social problems was a qualitative change, not
an incremental one. Worse, it had to be made when the Newfoundland and
Labrador public service was being drastically reduced to cut costs, declining
by 34.5 percent over 12 years.61 The result was a straitened public sector
that found it hard to carry out more than routine operations. Planning and
implementing a novel, sophisticated social policy initiative under those condi-
tions would necessarily be extremely difficult.
5.3. Summing up
The SSP had a lot to overcome to work as its proponents had hoped it
would. We have seen that it was unable to do so for a combination of rea-
sons. Some, such as having insufficient resources, could plausibly have
been corrected quickly. Others, like the historic centralism of government in
Newfoundland and Labrador, would take far longer to address. This has led
to the suspicion that the SSP was a case of SIBD: being able to say that
“something is being done”. Though it certainly did not start that way,
because the SSP demanded a substantial investment of time and effort from
many people inside and outside government to get started, it is possible that
as time passed and new issues arose to occupy government those in power
increasingly accepted as normal and desirable a small Strategic Social Plan.
This seems especially plausible since there was never any great public pres-
sure on government to expand or revise the program.
6. WHAT OTHERS CAN LEARN
The Strategic Social Plan of Newfoundland and Labrador had both suc-
cesses and failures that can serve as lessons for others. Regarding, first,
its achievements, whatever else the SSP did or did not do, it broke new
ground in Newfoundland and Labrador in four areas: recognizing the impor-
tance of horizontal collaboration between and among government depart-
ments; acknowledging the potential utility of civil society as both policy
instrument and policy actor; building a first set of mechanisms to link gov-
———————————
61. Statistics Canada, "Public sector employment, wages and salaries, monthly".
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ernment and civil society, here the VCBS; and taking steps toward focusing
on communities, thus thinking in terms of holistic approaches to public poli-
cy. Beyond these there was the creation of the Social Audit and Community
Accounts, the latter of which are still used to provide one-window access to
otherwise scattered social, economic, and demographic data. Finally, there
is anecdotal evidence that regional offices of government departments and
regional boards dealing with health, education, hospitals, and economic
development work together more often and more easily than before. The
question is what will be built on these somewhat modest results. This leads
us to the Plan’s failures.
The most serious failure was underestimating the scope of the changes
necessary to make a program like the SSP work. It really did require a near-
total rethinking of government, how it functioned and how it related to its citi-
zens. Reformers can appear at any time, but major reorientations generally
happen only at times of crisis –think of the New Deal in the United States in
the 1930s– or when a new regime emerges that alters the very bases of a
political system’s legitimacy and restructures most of its institutions, as hap-
pened in Spain after the death of Franco. For all its problems, Newfoundland
and Labrador did not face such dramatic prospects. That it had received a
horrible shock with the closure of the cod fishery is undeniable, but by the
late 1990s that shock was being assimilated and new economic possibilities
flowing from offshore oil were opening up. Perhaps if a determinedly
reformist party had won power the SSP could have prospered, but conditions
did not favour radical change.
A second weakness existed at the conceptual level. It now looks as if
too much was expected of the voluntary, community-based sector and that
not enough was done to help the sector and the people who drive it learn
to be part of a policy network –the actors in a policy field whom govern-
ment consults on a regular basis. As well, it is now evident that the struc-
ture of the Regional Steering Committees reflected a too strongly
government-centric perspective that privileged government and quasi-gov-
ernmental agencies. It is possible that this problem could had been
addressed had the SSP lasted longer, but it would have been preferable to
avoid it in the first place by raising the proportion of civil society represen-
tatives, and by naming people from the business community and local may-
ors and councilors to the RSCs.
Third, there is the question of scarce material support. One reason that
governments like civil society groups, especially volunteer agencies, is that
they work cheap. But that is no excuse for freezing funding to the SSP while
the provincial budget grew by over 20 percent. This, however, points to a
fourth failing of the Plan: it had little public support. Had the people clam-
oured for more resources for the RSCs and the SSP proper, they might have
been forthcoming; but silence called forth inaction. Of course its final weak-
ness was being unable to survive a change of government, which may be
another indicator of its lack of public support.
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No doubt the list of the SSP’s strengths and weaknesses could be
extended but the basic lessons its experience holds for policy reformers any-
where would still be:
• Pay attention to the institutional framework in which the reform will be
implemented. Having to change that framework while you change spe-
cific polices and processes is always a mammoth job.
• Be sure of your material support, both financial and personnel. Having
enough money and staff to get something started may sound satisfac-
tory but the SSP showed that increases are not always forthcoming.
• Try to assure that your project is either backed by all parties able to
win power or that it has gained enough institutional presence and pub-
lic support to make it hard for a new government to drop.
In the end, the SSP did not realize the hopes of its proponents and
designers, because it did not generate evidence-based policies and programs
to produce viable communities and sustainable regions. It did, however, show
that securing those objectives will require more support, financial, administra-
tive and public, than the Plan received. It also tested a model for regional con-
sultation that proved to need revision. Finally, it raised important questions
about what has to be done to let government engage the community-based,
voluntary sector, or the rest of civil society, in a genuinely devolved system of
governance. Though disappointing to its supporters, the SSP’s history should
help others design more effective instruments elsewhere.
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